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Business Associations
Stuart E. Walker*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys some noteworthy cases involving corporations
and limited liability companies decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals
between June 1, 2020, and May 31, 2021. 1
II. NOTEWORTHY CASES
A. A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani
A trial court abuses its discretion by permitting a “special
master/auditor” to serve simultaneously as an investigator, a fact
witness, and an adjudicator of factual and legal disputes—roles that are
“fundamentally incompatible” with one another. 2
In A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the Lowndes Superior Court abused its discretion
when it appointed someone to serve as an auditor/special master and
then permitted him to serve simultaneously as a fact witness in the case;
an investigator of the facts underlying the parties’ claims; and an
adjudicator of all questions of law and fact. 3
A different iteration of this case was previously before the court of
appeals and was discussed in the Author’s 2019 Business Associations
article for the Mercer Law Review.4 The trial court originally appointed
*Partner,

Martin Snow, LLP. University of Georgia (A.B., magna cum laude, 2001); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia. I
want to extend my sincerest thanks to Bryce Everett for his terrific and valuable work on
an initial draft of this Article.
1. For the summary of business associations in the prior Survey period, see Stuart E.
Walker, Business Associations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 21
(2020).
2. A&M Hospitalities, LLC v. Alimchandani, 359 Ga. App. 271, 276, 856 S.E.2d 704,
708 (2021).
3. Id. at 276, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
4. See Stuart E. Walker, Business Associations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 71
MERCER L. REV. 15 (2019).
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a lawyer named Christopher A. Cohilas to serve as a “limited receiver” in
a dispute among business partners. 5 When the order appointing Cohilas
was challenged on appeal, as having been entered without the requisite
showing of need, the court of appeals affirmed Cohilas’s appointment on
the ground that the trial court’s order did not vest Cohilas with the kind
of powers traditionally associated with receivers; so the appointment was
not required to be supported by the showing of necessity that applies to
the appointment of receivers generally.6
After that appeal was decided and the case returned to the trial court,
the superior court entered a second order appointing Cohilas to serve as
a special master/auditor.7 The second appointment order had the effect
of significantly expanding Cohilas’s authority. For example, under the
second appointment order—which was drafted by Cohilas—Cohilas,
among other things, was empowered to: conduct an accounting of the
defendant limited liability company; hear motions, allow amendments,
and pass upon all questions of law and fact; address all pretrial and
discovery matters; monitor implementation of and compliance with all
orders of the court; impose upon a party any non-contempt sanction
provided by Title 9, Chapter 11, Sections 37 and 45 of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated; conduct all trial proceedings and make and
recommend findings of fact on all issues to be decided by the court
without a jury; and engage in ex parte communications with the parties,
counsel, and the trial court for certain purposes. 8
In discharging his duties as an auditor/special master, Cohilas
engaged in numerous ex parte communications with the plaintiff’s
counsel concerning litigation strategy. He provided fact testimony used
by the plaintiff to support allegations in the plaintiff’s amended
complaint and was identified as a fact witness in the plaintiff’s written
discovery responses. The defendants challenged Cohilas’s renewed
appointment on appeal.9
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s appointment order,
concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in entering it. 10
Based on the capacious powers conferred on him by the appointment
order, and on the manner in which Cohilas discharged his duties during
the course of the litigation, the court of appeals determined that Cohilas
was serving simultaneously in three fundamentally incompatible roles:
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

A&M Hospitalities, LLC, 359 Ga. App. at 271, 856 S.E.2d at 705.
Id. at 272, 856 S.E.2d at 706.
Id.
Id. at 274–75, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
Id. at 272–73, 856 S.E.2d at 706–07.
Id. at 276, 856 S.E.2d at 708.
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as an investigator, a witness, and the adjudicator of factual and legal
disputes. The court of appeals concluded that these facts disqualified
Cohilas from serving as a special master in this case.11
B. Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC v. Jones
In Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC v. Jones,12 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a limited liability company that withheld a distribution
to one of its members for an unreasonably long period of time without
legal justification—while making pro rata distributions to its other
members—was liable for breach of contract to the member whose
distribution was unpaid.13
Timbervest, LLC (Timbervest), together with its officers and
managers (Joel Shapiro, Walter Boden III, Donald Zell Jr., and Gordon
Jones II), was sued by AT&T for alleged Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) violations. 14 The alleged violations
concerned the mismanagement by Timbervest of pension plan property
that AT&T had entrusted to Timbervest as an investment fiduciary.
Timbervest was owned by a single member: a limited liability company
called Ironwood Capital Partners, LLC (IPC). 15 IPC, in turn, was owned
by three members—Shapiro (50%), Boden (25%), and Zell (25%). 16 Jones
formerly owned 25% of IPC but later sold his interest to Shapiro. 17
Eventually, the AT&T suit settled for $6 million, but the settlement
agreement failed to specify how much of the total settlement each party
would pay.18
Jones was also a member of TEP Investors, LLC (TEPI), an affiliate of
Timbervest.19 In the suit that gave rise to this appeal, Jones sued TEPI
for breach of contract, on the basis that TEPI breached its operating
agreement when it failed to pay Jones a distribution in April 2016—but
paid pro rata distributions to TEPI’s other members. TEPI had
purposefully refused to pay the distribution to Jones on the ground that
Jones owed money to Timbervest from the AT&T settlement. Ironwood,
Shapiro, Boden, and Zell—all of whom were defendants in Jones’s suit
against TEPI—counterclaimed against Jones for breach of contract. They
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
355 Ga. App. 371, 844 S.E.2d 245 (2020).
Id. at 376, 844 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 372–73, 844 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 372, 844 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 372–73, 844 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 373, 844 S.E.2d at 248 n.1.
Id. at 380–81, 844 S.E.2d at 253.
Id. at 372–73, 844 S.E.2d at 248.
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argued that Jones breached an agreement under which he (Jones) had
agreed to be responsible for paying $1.5 million of the $6 million
settlement amount from the AT&T suit. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of Jones (1) on his breach of contract claim to recover
the unpaid distribution; and (2) on the defendants’ breach of contract
claim to recover Jones’s unpaid settlement contribution. The defendants
appealed these adverse rulings, and the court of appeals affirmed them. 20
The court of appeals first concluded that Jones was entitled to
summary judgment on his contract claim for the distribution payable to
him by TEPI, because TEPI withheld that distribution for an
unreasonably long period of time without any legal justification. 21 It
separately concluded that Jones was not liable for breach of contract to
Ironwood, Shapiro, Boden, or Zell.22 There was no evidence that Jones
accepted the defendants’ demand that he (Jones) undertake
responsibility to pay $1.5 million of the total settlement. As a result,
Jones was also entitled to summary judgment on their contract
counterclaim against him.23
The court of appeals further determined that the remainder of the
claims were subject to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions,
because those claims prayed for relief against Shapiro, who filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition during the pendency of the appeal. 24
C. Optum Construction Group, LLC v. City Electric Supply Company
In Optum Construction Group, LLC v. City Electric Supply Company,25
the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a fact dispute concerning the
identity of two business entities precluded summary judgment in favor
of a lien claimant—under Georgia’s materialman’s lien statute—because
it remained unclear whether the lien claimant’s debtor was in privity of
contract with the general contractor on the construction project at
issue.26
Optum Construction Group, LLC (Optum), a general contractor,
entered into a subcontract with Palmetto Power Services Palmetto Power
Unlimited, Inc. (Palmetto Unlimited), to perform electrical work on a
hotel property.27 Thereafter, Palmetto Power Services, LLC (Palmetto
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 373–74, 844 S.E.2d at 249.
Id. at 376, 844 S.E.2d at 250.
Id. at 379, 844 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 378–79, 844 S.E.2d at 252.
Id. at 374–75, 844 S.E.2d at 249.
356 Ga. App. 797, 849 S.E.2d 238 (2020).
Id. at 799, 849 S.E.2d at 239–40.
Id. at 797–98, 849 S.E.2d at 239.
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Services), purchased materials necessary to perform the electrical work
on the hotel property from a vendor, City Electric Supply Company (City
Electric). City Electric notified Optum that it had furnished materials for
use on the property at the request of Palmetto Power. 28
After Palmetto Unlimited abandoned work on the project and failed to
pay City Electric charges exceeding $100,000, City Electric filed a
materialman’s lien against the hotel property, where the work was being
performed, in the amount of $123,716. 29 Optum discharged the lien by
engaging its insurer to issue a lien-release bond in the amount of
$247,432. City Electric sued Palmetto Services and eventually settled its
claims and secured a confession of judgment from Palmetto Services for
the unpaid charges. City Electric then sued Optum and its insurer to
recover $109,379 under the lien-release bond issued by Optum’s
insurer.30 City Electric and Optum filed competing motions for summary
judgment on the bond claim. The Gwinnett County State Court granted
summary judgment in favor of City Electric, thus denying summary
judgment to Optum. Both parties appealed.31
On appeal, Optum argued that there was a genuine issue of material
fact concerning whether City Electric was a proper lien claimant because
there was no “chain of contracts” linking Palmetto Services, City
Electric’s debtor, to Optum.32 Under Georgia law, in order for a lien
claimant to have a validly attached materialman’s lien, the claimant
must prove “a contractual relationship, either directly or through a chain
of contracts, between the owner of the property and the person to whom
the materials are furnished.”33 Optum’s contract was with Palmetto
Unlimited, which represented itself to be a corporation; however, Optum
acknowledged that Palmetto Unlimited was organized as a limited
liability company—which, in the view of the court of appeals, could
support an inference “that the named subcontractor never existed.”34

28. Id. at 798, 849 S.E.2d at 239.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 799, 849 S.E.2d at 240 n.1.
31. Id. at 798, 849 S.E.2d at 239.
32. Id. at 799, 849 S.E.2d at 240. Optum, recall, had entered a subcontract with
Palmetto Unlimited, not Palmetto Services. Id.
33. Id. at 799, 849 S.E.2d at 240 (quoting Benning Constr. Co. v. Dykes Paving &
Constr. Co., 263 Ga. 16, 18–19, 426 S.E.2d 564, 566 (1993)). The opinion does not make
clear whether Optum was the owner of the property where the construction was taking
place—as seems to be required by the language quoted from Benning Constr. Co.—or
whether Optum simply had a contract with the property owner. The latter seems more
probable, but the opinion leaves the reader wondering.
34. Optum Constr. Group, LLC, 356 Ga. App. at 800, 849 S.E.2d at 240.

34

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

Considering the discrepancy between the name of the company that
entered into the subcontract with Optum and the name of the company
that purchased the materials from City Electric, the court of appeals
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of City Electric. 35 It
concluded that “the record contains conflicting evidence regarding
whether City Electric was in a contractual relationship with Optum.” 36
As a result, a genuine issue of material fact existed about whether there
was a chain of contracts linking the lien claimant’s debtor to the general
contractor.37
D. Ridgewalk Holdings, LLC v. Atlanta Apartment Investment
Corporation
To demand inspection of a limited liability company’s books and
records under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-313(3),38 the demanding party must be a
“member” of the limited liability company at the time the demand is
filed.39
In Ridgewalk Holdings, LLC v. Atlanta Apartment Investment
Corporation, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a fact dispute
precluded summary judgment to a party claiming to be a member of a
limited liability company.40 The alleged member filed a demand to
inspect the company’s books and records under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-313
although, before the demand was made, the demanding party had
pledged its membership interest to secure the repayment of a loan and
may have assigned away any interest in the limited liability company. 41
The court determined that if, for these reasons, the demanding party was
not a member of the limited liability company at the time that the
demand for inspection was filed, the party could not invoke the statutory
inspection process.42
Advocate Investments, LLC (Advocate), was a member of Ridgewalk
Property Investments, LLC (RPI).43 In 2009, Advocate pledged its

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. O.C.G.A. § 14-11-313(3) (2021).
39. See Ridgewalk Holdings, LLC v. Atlanta Apartment Inv. Corp., 358 Ga. App. 717,
721, 856 S.E.2d 75, 79 (2021).
40. Id. at 722, 856 S.E.2d at 79.
41. Id. at 721–22, 856 S.E.2d at 79.
42. Id. at 722, 856 S.E.2d at 79. The appeal involved a dispute over a party’s
entitlement to a real estate commission, but the statutory-inspection-process aspect of the
case is the only one that merits discussion here.
43. Id. at 717, 856 S.E.2d at 76.
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membership interest in RPI to secure the repayment of a loan. RPI
alleged that Advocate, later in 2014, “assigned away” any interest that it
once owned in RPI. Advocate later sued RPI over an unpaid real estate
broker’s commission that RPI allegedly owed Advocate. In connection
with the pursuit of its claim in that suit, Advocate made a demand on
RPI under O.C.G.A. § 14-11-313(3) for inspection of RPI’s records. 44
RPI refused to allow Advocate to inspect the records on the ground
that Advocate was no longer a member of RPI because Advocate had
assigned away its membership interest. 45 Advocate moved for summary
judgment on its inspection claim. The Cobb County Superior Court
denied the motion, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed
concerning whether Advocate remained a member of RPI at the time the
request for inspection was made.46
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment,
concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed: whether
Advocate remained a member in RPI at the time it filed its inspection
demand.47 Given that dispute, summary judgment was improper.48
E. G&E Construction, LLC v. Rubicon Construction, Inc.
In G&E Construction, LLC v. Rubicon Construction, Inc.,49 the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that, for purposes of applying O.C.G.A.
§ 14-2-204,50 the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by the
Secretary of State is conclusive evidence of a corporation’s existence.51
The court further held that a corporation’s veil of legal separateness
cannot be pierced—and the shareholders’ assets reached—based on
allegations that the corporation’s shareholder, without more, failed to
respect corporate formalities in operating the corporation. 52
In 2002, Jason Insogna formed Rubicon Construction, Inc. (Rubicon),
and became its sole shareholder.53 Rubicon was a general contractor that
built and renovated houses. Insogna hired Rubicon to renovate his and
his wife’s own house. Rubicon, thereafter, hired G&E Construction, LLC
(G&E), to work on the Insognas’ house. Rubicon was dissolved in 2017.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 721, 856 S.E.2d at 79.
Id.
Id. at 721, 856 S.E.2d at 77.
Id. at 722, 856 S.E.2d at 80.
Id. at 719, 849 S.E.2d at 78.
357 Ga. App. 55, 849 S.E.2d 785 (2020).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204 (2021).
G&E Constr., LLC, 357 Ga. App. at 57–58, 849 S.E.2d at 788.
Id. at 59–60, 849 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 55–56, 58, 849 S.E.2d at 787, 788–89.
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G&E later sued Rubicon and Insogna, to recover for unpaid work on the
Insognas’ house, all of which was performed by G&E before Rubicon’s
2017 dissolution.54
G&E sought to hold Insogna personally liable for Rubicon’s unpaid
debt under two separate theories: (1) that Insogna acted on behalf of a
non-existent corporation and was thus personally liable for its debts
under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204;55 and (2) that Rubicon’s corporate veil should
be pierced—and thus Insogna’s personal assets reached—because
Insogna did not observe corporate formalities with respect to the
management and operation of Rubicon.56 G&E did not allege that
Insogna had engaged in wrongdoing or fraud or acted in bad faith in
connection with his operation of Rubicon. 57 The Dekalb County State
Court granted Insogna’s motion for summary judgment on G&E’s claims.
G&E appealed.58
The court of appeals rejected both of G&E’s arguments for holding
Insogna personally liable for Rubicon’s debt. 59 First, the court held that
the issuance of a certificate of incorporation by the Secretary of State,
which Rubicon had been issued upon its incorporation in 2002, is
conclusive evidence of a corporation’s existence. 60 This defeats any claim
for personal liability under O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204, so long as the actions
taken by a shareholder—in this case, Insogna—on the corporation’s
behalf occurred during the time when the certificate of incorporation was
in existence. The actions of Insogna were all taken before Rubicon’s
certificate of incorporation was terminated.61 Second, the court held—
reiterating a previously settled point of law—that a shareholder’s mere
failure to respect corporate formality, standing alone, will not, absent
evidence of “wrongdoing, fraud, or bad faith,” support the piercing of a
corporation’s veil so as to render the shareholder personally liable for the
corporation’s debts.62

54. Id. at 56, 849 S.E.2d at 787.
55. “‘[I]mposes personal liability on one who, with culpable knowledge, incurs liabilities
on behalf of a non-existent corporation.’” G&E Constr., LLC, 357 Ga. App. at 57, 849 S.E.2d
at 787 (quoting Zuberi v. Gimbert, 230 Ga. App. 471, 472, 496 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1998)).
56. G&E Constr., LLC, 357 Ga. App. at 55–56, 849 S.E.2d at 787.
57. Id. at 59–60, 849 S.E.2d at 789.
58. Id. at 55, 849 S.E.2d at 787.
59. Id. at 56, 849 S.E.2d at 787.
60. Id. at 57, 849 S.E.2d at 788.
61. Id. at 56, 849 S.E.2d at 787.
62. Id. at 59–60, 849 S.E.2d at 789.
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F. Wimpy v. Martin
In Wimpy v. Martin,63 the Georgia Court of Appeals reiterated a
settled principle of law and held that the same conduct can give rise to a
claim for both breach of contract and a claim sounding in tort—such as,
a breach of fiduciary duty.64
Floyd Wimpy, Jimmie Martin, and Anne Vail entered into a written
partnership agreement to perform construction work on a house in
Ellijay, Georgia.65 They later entered into an oral partnership agreement
to perform construction work on a house in Fitzgerald, Georgia. The three
agreed to share equally in the profits and losses from the partnership’s
construction work on both houses. Under their agreements, Vail was
responsible for the bidding process and for overall project management;
Martin was responsible for furnishing labor for the jobs and managing
the construction work; and Wimpy was responsible for maintaining the
partnerships’ finances. After excluding Martin’s construction crew from
carrying out Martin’s duties and instead using his own construction crew
on the two projects, Wimpy refused to pay Martin his share of the profits
from the projects. Martin thereafter sued Wimpy for the amounts owed,
on theories of breach of contract and tort—breach of fiduciary duties.66
A jury rejected Martin’s contract claim but awarded damages in favor
of Martin, compensatory and punitive, on his tort claim against Wimpy. 67
Wimpy appealed the jury verdict against him, arguing that Martin’s tort
claim could not be asserted independently of his contract claim and that,
because the jury rejected the contract claim, the jury also should have
rejected the tort claim. In addition, Wimpy argued that the economic loss
doctrine barred Martin’s recovery in tort.68
The court of appeals affirmed the jury’s award of tort damages,
rejecting as without merit Wimpy’s argument that Martin’s breach of
fiduciary duty tort claim, as a matter of law, could not be asserted
independently of the contract claim. 69 In so holding, the court reiterated
the settled principle that the same conduct can give rise to both a claim
for breach of contract and a claim for the breach of any separate duty

63. 356 Ga. App. 55, 846 S.E.2d 230 (2020).
64. Id. at 56, 846 S.E.2d at 233.
65. Id. at 55, 846 S.E.2d at 233.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 56, 846 S.E.2d at 233.
68. Id. “The economic loss doctrine generally provides that a contracting party who
suffers purely economic losses must seek his remedy in contract and not in tort.” Id. at 58,
846 S.E.2d at 235 n.3 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
69. Id. at 56, 846 S.E.2d at 233.
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imposed by law—so long as the party’s conduct in fact constitutes a
breach of the non-contractual duty.70
G. North Walhalla Properties, LLC v. Kennestone Gates Condominium
Association, Inc.
In North Walhalla Properties, LLC v. Kennestone Gates Condominium
Association, Inc.,71 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a member of a
condominium association lacked standing to sue such association and its
director for breaches of contract and breaches of fiduciary duties. 72 The
association member failed to allege any harms suffered by it individually
and instead asserted only harms suffered by all association members. 73
Kennestone Gates Condominium Association, Inc. (Kennestone) is a
non-profit corporation incorporated under Georgia law. North Walhalla
Properties, LLC (NWP), was a member of Kennestone and also owned
properties in the condominium development, for whose benefit
Kennestone was incorporated. Dissatisfied with the way that Kennestone
and its officers were conducting the business of the homeowners’
association, NWP sued Kennestone and one of its directors for breaches
of contract and breaches of fiduciary duties. 74
70. Id. at 56, 846 S.E.2d at 233–34. The court separately rejected Wimpy’s argument
that the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to support the jury finding that
Wimpy, by failing to pay Martin his share of the profits from the construction projects, had
breached the fiduciary duties he owed to Martin. The court also held that Martin had
waived any argument based on the economic loss doctrine by failing to raise it in the trial
court. Id. at 57–58, 846 S.E.2d at 234–35.
71. 358 Ga. App. 272, 855 S.E.2d 35 (2021).
72. Id. at 275, 855 S.E.2d at 39.
73. Id. at 275, 855 S.E.2d at 38–39.
74. Id. at 272–73, 855 S.E.2d at 37. In particular, in support of its fiduciary duty claims,
NWP alleged that the defendants:
[E]ngaged in “ultra vires actions by the Board and officers not authorized under
the Declaration, Bylaws, or law”; failed to make various disclosures to
membership prior to called meetings; failed to call and have meetings in
violation of its Declaration and Bylaws; failed to provide a budget and profit and
loss statements 30 days in advance of meetings; failed to disclose identities of
vendors or provide copies of contracts between third parties or evidence of
payment; maintained and managed escrow accounts without authority; charged
for services not rendered or made available to [NWP]; failed to properly maintain
common areas; assessed “attorney[ ] fees and expenses not related to the
collection of fees, rather for advice received by them in their continuing efforts
to disguise and to deny breaches of contract or fiduciary duty”; assessed [NWP’s]
units for work and improvements to limited common areas and individual units
owned by others; assessed excessive fees and ignored a right of set-off for
previous assessments paid, but not owed; and failed to provide to members
minutes of annual and special meetings.
Id. at 273, 855 S.E.2d at 37–38. In addition, NWP alleged that Kennestone’s director and
corporate officer breached fiduciary duties owed to NWP “‘and other similarly situated
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Kennestone moved for summary judgment on all of NWP’s claims,
arguing that NWP lacked standing to bring them. 75 The Cobb County
Superior Court granted Kennestone’s motion, and NWP appealed. 76
The court of appeals first summarized the relevant principles
concerning direct versus derivative shareholder suits:
[T]o have standing to sue individually, rather than derivatively on
behalf of the corporation, the plaintiff must allege more than an injury
resulting from a wrong to the corporation. To set out an individual
action, the plaintiff must allege either an injury which is separate and
distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, or a wrong involving
a contractual right of a shareholder which exists independently of any
right of the corporation. For a plaintiff to have standing to bring an
individual action, he must be injured directly or independently of the
corporation.77

The court reiterated that these principles apply both to claims against
the corporation itself and to claims against the corporation’s officers and
directors.78 The court noted that certain categories of claims—namely,
“claims related to election procedures, breach of fiduciary duties,
negligent misuse of corporate funds, usurpation of corporate
opportunities, personal use of assets without sufficient compensation,
mismanagement, and corporate waste”—have been held not to be
“separate and distinct causes of action creating a right of direct action in
an individual member.”79 After reviewing the allegations in NWP’s
complaint and the summary judgment record, the court of appeals
concluded that NWP’s “allegations are devoid of any separate and
distinct injury that would allow it to sue individually,” and that, as a

owner members’ [of Kennestone] by engaging in self-dealing and excess billing, failing to
prepare annual budget reports and call annual meetings, and violating the Declaration and
Bylaws by receiving compensation.” Id. at 273, 855 S.E.2d at 38.
75. Id. at 273–74, 855 S.E.2d at 38. The question was whether NWP (as a member of
Kennestone) was authorized to bring its claims against Kennestone and Kennestone’s
director in NWP’s individual capacity or whether NWP was required to pursue those claims
in the name of Kennestone, in a derivative proceeding, for the benefit of all of Kennestone’s
members. The court of appeals noted that it was undisputed that NWP was statutorily
barred from bringing a derivative action because it did not own the requisite percentage of
voting power in Kennestone. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-3-741 (2021)). So, the question on
appeal was whether Georgia law permitted NWP to pursue its claims in its own name for
its own benefit. This is often the case when shareholders bring claims against the
corporations they own and their corporate officers.
76. North Walhalla Properties, LLC, 358 Ga. App. at 274, 855 S.E.2d at 38.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 275, 855 S.E.2d at 38.
79. Id.
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result, “the trial court properly concluded that [NWP] lacked standing to
bring its claims against Kennestone and [Kennestone’s director].” 80 The
harms alleged by NWP, in other words, were harms suffered by all of
Kennestone’s members, not solely by NWP.
Rather than affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of the defendants, however, the court of appeals vacated that order
and remanded the case with directions that it be dismissed—because the
question of a shareholder’s standing raises an issue of subject matter
jurisdiction and not the merits of the shareholder’s claim. 81
H. Callicott v. Scott
In Callicott v. Scott,82 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
minority shareholder lacked standing to bring a direct action against the
majority shareholders in a closely held corporation.83 Instead, the
shareholder was required to bring her claims as a derivative action on
behalf of the corporation itself. 84
Terilyn Callicot was a minority shareholder in a corporation named
Homeowners Mortgage of America, Inc. (HOMA). Callicot brought a
direct action against HOMA’s other shareholders, who controlled a
majority of HOMA’s shares, and those shareholders’ affiliated business
entities for various breaches of fiduciary duty. 85 The defendants moved
for summary judgment, arguing that Callicot lacked standing to pursue
her claims individually and that, instead, Callicot should have pursued
her claims in a derivative action.86
The Cobb County Superior Court denied the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, finding that the reasons requiring a derivative

80. Id. at 275, 855 S.E.2d at 39.
81. Id. at 277, 855 S.E.2d at 40.
82. 357 Ga. App. 780, 849 S.E.2d 547 (2020).
83. Id. at 787, 849 S.E.2d at 553.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 780, 849 S.E.2d at 548–49. In support of her fiduciary duty claims, Callicott
alleged that the HOMA’s majority members:
[B]reached their fiduciary duties to HOMA by inter alia (1) entering into
contracts with the [other entity] defendants “on commercially unreasonable
terms while contracting under a conflict-of-interest with respect to those
entities”; (2) devoting their loyalty and care to the [other entity] defendants
during times they were obligated to be performing services for HOMA; (3)
usurping corporate opportunities by siphoning fees away from HOMA to
[another entity defendant]; and (4) transferring millions of dollars in additional
funds belonging to HOMA to themselves and third parties. Id. at 784, 849 S.E.
at 551.
86. Id. at 784–85, 849 S.E.2d at 551.

2021

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

41

action did not apply.87 The court of appeals reversed the denial of
summary judgment.88 It concluded that Callicot’s allegations did not
raise individual harms and that, separately, the creditor-protection
rationale that ordinarily counsels in favor of requiring a derivative action
did apply. The court of appeals thus reversed the trial court’s order
denying summary judgment to HOMA’s majority members and their
affiliated business entities on Callicott’s claims. 89
I. Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corporation
The component of the business judgment rule that permits corporate
officers and directors to assert their reliance on the advice of legal counsel
as a defense to tort claims against them—O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b)90—does
not protect officers or directors against fiduciary duty claims unrelated
to the matters for which the corporation sought and received legal
advice.91
In Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corporation, the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the “reliance on professional advice” component of the business
judgment rule92 does not shield corporate officer and directors from
fiduciary duty claims that are based on conduct unrelated to the matters
for which professional advice was sought, received, and relied on. 93
In 2004, Spencer and Sara Lambeth bought a home in Sandy Springs
in a subdivision named Lake Forest. The subdivision had three lakes—
an upper, a middle, and a lower—and each lake had a dam associated
with it. The Lambeths’ property adjoined the “lower” lake. 94 In 1964, a
company named Three Lakes Corporation (TLC) had been incorporated
to hold title to the lakes and to maintain them for the benefit of TLC’s
members. Each owner of property adjoining a lake became a member of

87. Id. at 785, 849 S.E.2d at 551.
88. Id. at 781, 849 S.E.2d at 549.
89. Id. at 789, 849 S.E.2d at 554. “[W]e agree with the defendants that Callicott failed
to allege a special injury that would give her standing to pursue her claims directly.” Id. at
787, 849 S.E.2d at 553. “Here, Callicott’s direct action could circumvent [HOMA’s creditor’s]
rights as a creditor because any recovery would go to Callicott, and not HOMA. [] Because
[HOMA had] a creditor in need of protection, the exception permitting a direct action
instead of through a derivative suit cannot be applied in this case.” Id. at 789, 849 S.E.2d
at 554.
90. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b) (2021).
91. Lambeth v. Three Lakes Corp., 357 Ga. App. 546, 550, 851 S.E.2d 181, 184 (2020).
92. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830 (2021).
93. Lambeth, 357 Ga. App. at 550, 851 S.E.2d at 184.
94. Id. at 546, 851 S.E.2d at 182.
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TLC—including the Lambeths. The dams were jointly owned by TLC, the
City of Atlanta, and Sandy Springs.95
Soon after purchasing his home, Spencer Lambeth inspected the dams
and noticed that a buildup of debris in the upper-lake dam was causing
water to flow over its emergency spillway. 96 He informed TLC of the
problem, but TLC took no action. In 2006, Spencer inspected the lakes
and dams with a TLC board member named Neal Sweeney. Sweeney
reported in an email to TLC’s board of directors that the upper-lake dam
was blocked and that water was spilling over its emergency spillway. In
response, TLC engaged an engineer named Mike Ballard to inspect the
lakes and dams. Ballard made a recommendation in November 2008 that
certain trees and vegetation be removed from the slopes of the dams and
that the lower-lake dam’s downstream slope be flattened. Ballard’s report
said that the lower-lake dam would probably be classified as a
“Category 1 (high hazard) dam” under regulations issued by the Georgia
Environmental Protection Division (EPD). Spencer later testified that no
action was taken on the issues raised in his report. 97
In 2009 an engineering firm engaged by TLC classified the lower-lake
dam as a Category 1 dam. The engineering firm’s report concluded that:
(i) a failure of the lower-lake dam would affect eleven buildings and
would flood area residences, (ii) ten structures were in the
flood-inundation zone, and (iii) the lower-lake dam posed a serious risk
of destruction and loss of life.98
In May 2009, the EPD sent TLC a letter informing the company of the
dam’s reclassification, giving instructions for remediation, and giving
180 days for TLC to apply for a permit from EPD to operate the dams.99
No permit was ever obtained. In September 2009, TLC acknowledged
partial ownership of the dams but said it was not obligated to take
further action to repair the dam. In May 2012 another engineering firm,
hired by Sandy Springs, issued a report noting the deficiencies of the
lower-lake dam.100
In May 2013 the EPD sent TLC another warning letter about the
condition of the dams and TLC’s obligation to inspect them and to file
reports with the EPD.101 Two years later an engineering firm hired by
TLC, Carter Engineering, represented by Brian Kimsey, issued a report

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 546–47, 851 S.E.2d at 182.
Id. at 547, 851 S.E.2d at 182.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 547, 851 S.E.2d at 182–83.
Id. at 547–48, 851 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 548, 851 S.E.2d at 183.
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concluding that TLC needed to work with Sandy Springs and the City of
Atlanta to devise a plan to bring the dams into compliance with EPD
standards. From 2015 to 2016, Sandy Springs removed trees from TLC
property and drained the lower lake of its water, creating a dry lakebed
overgrown with weeds.102
The Lambeths sued TLC asserting that TLC had breached its fiduciary
duties in failing to maintain the lakes and dams. Specifically, the
Lambeths alleged that:
TLC failed (from 2009 through 2017) to protect its and its members’
interests as required by the corporate charter by, inter alia, failing to
properly maintain the lakes and dams, allowing trees and vegetation
to grow on all three dams, allowing certain deficiencies to exist, failing
to inspect or determine the condition of the dams, and failing to comply
with the EPD’s requirements regarding dam permits and
inspections.103

They additionally alleged:
[T]he failure to address instances of trespass by Sandy Springs’s
contractors, failure to seek permission of members before allowing
Sandy Springs’s representatives to undertake activities impacting
their properties, failure to address the unsafe conditions and
deficiencies of the dams, failure to maintain control of TLC property
and the relinquishment of control to the Cities, and failure to
participate in decision-making processes regarding work related to the
lower lake and dam.104

The Lambeths sought money damages to account for the diminution
in the value of their property and sought a temporary restraining order
and an interlocutory injunction requiring TLC to restore water to the
lower lake; to secure an EPD permit for the dam; and to devise a
remediation plan.105 TLC moved for summary judgment against the
Lambeths’ claims based on the business judgment rule. The Fulton
County Superior Court granted TLC’s motion, concluding that the
business judgment rule barred the claims.106
Under Georgia law, corporate officers and directors owe fiduciary
duties to a corporations’ shareholders, and a corporation has a fiduciary
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Id.
Id. at 548–49, 851 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 549, 851 S.E.2d at 183.
Id. at 549, 851 S.E.2d at 184.
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duty to protect its property for the benefit of its shareholders. 107 The
business judgment rule—codified at O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830:
[P]recludes claims against officers and directors for their business
decisions that sound in ordinary negligence, except to the extent that
those decisions are shown to have been made without deliberation,
without the requisite diligence to ascertain and assess the facts and
circumstances upon which the decisions are based, or in bad faith.108

The rule requires that corporate officers and directors act with “good
faith and with the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances.” 109 In discharging
their duties, officers and directors are entitled to rely on “[i]nformation,
data, opinions, reports, or statements provided by . . . legal counsel . . . or
other persons as to matters involving the skills, expertise, or knowledge
reasonably believed to be reliable and within such person’s professional
or expert competence.”110 Under the business judgment rule, officers and
directors are presumed to have discharged their duties in good faith and
to have exercised ordinary care, but that presumption can be rebutted by
evidence of gross negligence.111
Invoking the “reliance rule” set forth in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b), TLC
argued that the business judgment rule precluded the Lambeths’ claims
because TLC sought, received, and relied on legal advice from three
lawyers in deciding how to deal with the lakes and dams. 112 The legal
advice sought and received by TLC, however, concerned only the draining
of the lake by Sandy Springs and the City of Atlanta and whether TLC
should sue the cities for having done so. Importantly, however, TLC did
not seek or receive legal advice concerning any of the conduct underlying
the Lambeths’ breach of fiduciary duty claims, and none of their claims
were based on TLC’s failure to sue the cities for their draining of the lake.
Nevertheless, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of TLC,
concluding that the Lambeths’ tort claims were barred by the business
judgment rule.113
The court of appeals, however, reversed the grant of summary
judgment.114 The court observed that the
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Id.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(a) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b)(2) (2021).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(c) (2021).
Lambeth, 357 Ga. App. at 550, 851 S.E.2d at 184.
Id. at 551, 851 S.E.2d at 185.
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Lambeths set out in their complaint numerous allegations of TLC’s
breaches, neglect, and failures to act in accordance with its fiduciary
duties (e.g., the failures to properly maintain the lakes and dams, to
determine the condition of and address the unsafe condition of the
dams, and to comply with dam regulations such as obtaining a dam
operating permit).115

But, the court stressed TLC had failed to show that any of the legal
advice it sought, received, or relied on—which, again, formed the basis of
TLC’s assertion of the business judgment rule—related to the claims
asserted by the Lambeths.116 Consequently, the “reliance rule” set forth
in O.C.G.A. § 14-2-830(b) was unavailable to the Lambeths. 117
III. THE GEORGIA STATE-WIDE BUSINESS COURT
The rules of the Georgia State-wide Business Court—which had been
proposed but not adopted as of the writing of last year’s Business
Associations article—became effective on August 1, 2021. 118 As a result,
the Uniform Superior Court Rules are no longer the governing rules of
procedure in the business court, as they had been between August 1,
2020, and August 1, 2021.119
Readers should be aware of an order entered on October 27, 2020—
authored by Judge Sara L. Doyle of the Georgia Court of Appeals, sitting
by
designation.
The
business
court
determined
that
O.C.G.A. § 15-5A-4(a)(3) strips the business court of subject matter
jurisdiction to hear any case sought to be transferred to it by the petition
of any party—namely a case filed originally in state or superior court—
when any other party to the pending case files in the business court a
timely objection to the petition to transfer. 120 Judge Doyle wrote,
“[o]bjection is fatal to the transfer under the language of the governing
statute.”121

115. Id. at 550–51, 851 S.E.2d at 185.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 551, 851 S.E.2d at 185.
118. Honorable Walter W. Davis, Judge, Rules, Orders, and Forms, Georgia State-wide
Business Court, https://www.georgiabusinesscourt.com/rules-orders-forms/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2021).
119. Id.
120. New Statewide Business Court Faces ‘Fatal’ Flaw, Daily Report (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/7c6a7fea-e885-43e0-baacfd4f491d59bb/?context=1530671 (citing Overlook Gardens Properties, LLC v. ORIX USA,
L.P., No. 20-GSBC-0002 (Ga. Bus. Ct. Oct. 27, 2020) vacated, 2021 WL 1435183 (Ga. Bus.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2021)).
121. Id.
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In media coverage following the entry of that order, Judge Walter W.
Davis, the sole judge of the business court, called the unilateral-objection
rule imposed by the statute “an existential issue for the court.”122 It was
hoped by Judge Davis and others that the Georgia General Assembly
might pass legislation during the 2021 session to rectify the result
created by the statute’s language.123 That has not yet happened. It
remains to be seen whether the General Assembly will take up this issue
during its 2022 legislative session.
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123. Id.

